

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]  
Special Assistant to the DCI

FROM: Robert W. Gambino  
Chairman

SUBJECT: Compartmentation Review

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1. This memorandum is to confirm and amplify my 9 November 1978 observations on the proposed modifications of the compartmentation programs.

2. The latest changes in the [REDACTED] concept are well taken. They simplify the overall program and offer more encouraging avenues toward viable implementation.

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3. Identifying the informational needs of different elements in the process of collecting and producing intelligence will contribute to the difficult process of determining need-to-know of individuals. There is no requirement for all the people who build the different collection platforms to have access to the collected data. There is no requirement for all individuals responsible for processing the raw intelligence, e.g., cryptographers, translators, photo interpreters to have access to complete knowledge of the collection platform e.g., cost, contractor, operational specifications. There is no requirement for all analysts or producers of finished intelligence to have full access authority to all information that went into the collection process.

4. The proposal to have the collecting authorities prepare extracts of operational material to satisfy needs of first line processors of raw data such as photo interpreters has successful precedents. However, the data must not be gratuitous in scope or detail. The dissemination of this information must be conducted on grounds of an absolute need-to-know and the material must be controlled on a continuing basis.

5. The proposal to compartment only that intelligence that meets the E.O. 12065 test for TOP SECRET classification generates concern. The E.O. controls for TOP SECRET material are generally viewed as too resource draining to be practical when large volumes of material are at issue. This might exert considerable pressure to classify material at a lower level. The material, under the current proposal, then becomes ineligible for compartmentation and the extra controls on dissemination afforded by compartmentation. Every one with a SECRET level clearance then has potential access to the material. 25X1



of the individual. Recognizing this, the Intelligence Community proposed and the DCI adopted more stringent and uniform personnel security criteria for access to compartmented intelligence. In consideration of the increased volume of sensitive material coming out of compartmented systems under the current proposals, I believe that compliance with the personnel security standards prescribed in DCID 1/14 must be adopted as a condition precedent for access to National Foreign Intelligence. I recommend that you propose this in subsequent discussions with the members of your group.

7. The proposal to configure a tighter criteria for determination of what material should be compartmented that was offered by [redacted] is viewed with favor. The concept of a "negative presumption" i.e., nothing should be compartmented is worthy of additional consideration during the implementation stages. It may be that this approach would be viable in all but easily predetermined situations of collection efforts and techniques and certain topics prepared for finished intelligence dissemination.

8. There is need to fashion a means of checks and balance over proposals by the collector/program manager for compartmentation of intelligence product. [redacted] did not offer sufficient detail to allow easy implementation of this facet of his concept. In the current exercise, consideration will have to be addressed to resources needed to ensure equitable evaluation of the concerns of the collector and the needs of the consumer. 25X1

9. The proposal that Senior Intelligence Officers exercise access authority continues the long standing tenet that need-to-know is a function of command. To provide data necessary for centralized management and accountability by the DCI, it would be desirable to have each SIO maintain a cumulative listing of personnel authorized for access to each of the agreed-on categories of information under TOP SECRET Apex. CIA can continue to offer to the community the facilities of the [redacted]

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[redacted] as a service of common concern.

10. The DCI should maintain at a central facility the listings of all subjects and personnel authorized access to the [redacted]. Again the [redacted] could be adapted to this use. Under his responsibility for protection of sources and methods of intelligence the DCI should have sole authority over all determinations related to dissemination of National Foreign Intelligence to non-NFIB Agencies.

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11. In summary, it is believed that the modified [redacted] proposal for revamping our compartmentation programs is an improvement with better chances of successful implementation. It represents a significant departure from current practices but does so in accordance with new Executive level orders and guidelines for the protection of classified material. It offers opportunity for the DCI to institute realistic and viable control procedures over National Foreign Intelligence through centralized management. It strengthens protection by more clearly defining areas of need-to-know and circumscribes revelation of sensitive information about sources and methods while providing for optimum dissemination.

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